Individual-level explanations of electoral participation typically argue that non-voting is determined by a combination of facilitative and motivational factors. We advance the argument that, beyond individual characteristics, there are pivotal contextual features which enable or impede individual action through specific incentive structures. Thus, contextual factors influence the individual propensity to vote or to abstain. For the first time the data of Selects 2003 allows for the testing of contextual effects, at least on the cantonal level. Several multilevel analyses show that high party competition, compulsory voting, and strong Catholicism foster individual participation. The findings clearly indicate that an individual's propensity to vote is influenced by personal characteristics as well as by cantonal attributes. 
Introduction
In this article we focus on individual electoral participation at the Swiss federal elections of 2003. More specifically, we investigate the determinants of an individual's propensity to vote by looking at individual and contextual characteristics.
For more than thirty years the majority of the Swiss have not gone to the polls during national elections. In 2003, only 45.2% of all Swiss citizens exercised their right to vote. In international comparisons, Switzerland, together with the USA, appears at the end of the turnout ranking list (cf. Freitag 1996) . However, if we take a look at the sub-national level (the Swiss cantons), we can observe striking differences in turnout rates at national elections in the different cantons. In 2003, turnout varied around the national mean of 45.2%, from 25.3% in Glarus to 63.2% in Schaffhausen. How can we explain these sub-national level differences? Are the citizens of the canton Zug (52.6%) more interested in politics, therefore showing a greater propensity to vote than the citizens of the canton Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (35.1%)? Does the specific institutional setting in the canton of Valais (53.6%) foster the individual's willingness to go to the polls to a higher degree than the different institutional setting in the canton of Grisons (39.1%)?
Three reasons demonstrate the relevance of an empirical investigation in seeking to answer these kinds of questions. First, although the turnout rate in Switzerland is very low, empirical research on electoral participation in Switzerland is surprisingly rare (Bühlmann et al. 2003) . If "participation is the lifeblood of democracy" (Franklin 2002: 148) , the reasons and sources of the low Swiss turnout should be of interest.
1 Cantonal comparisons could even be seen as a 'terra incognita' of participation research (exceptions in this regard are Freitag (2005) and Wernli (1998 Wernli ( , 2001 ). This contribution aims to fill this research gap.
Second, besides the strikingly low Swiss electoral turnout and the differences in turnout rates between the cantons, it is worth specifying another Swiss particularity. The 26 cantons are considered as 26 different political systems (Kriesi 1998; Klöti 1998) , not only in terms of the institutional settings, but also in terms of the decision-making processes for national elections (Caramani 1996) . Any attempt to explain an individual's propensity to vote must take into account the differences in the context in which the individual lives. We mainly assume that different contextual settings will have different impacts on individual participation. We also expect different interactions between contextual and individual characteristics. In other words: differences in individual resources play a key role in explaining individual participation behaviour, but the latter also depends on the canton in which a person lives. On the one hand the cantonal context builds a framework which fosters or hinders the individual's propensity to vote, and on the other hand, the effect of individual resources on participation also differs from context to context. Third, we advance a methodological argument. We hypothesise that an individual's propensity to vote is influenced by both his personal characteristics as well as by contextual attributes. Individual-level explanations of electoral participation on the one hand typically argue that non-voting is determined by a combination of facilitative and motivational variables. Motivational factors as such include ideology, political attitudes, and basic tendencies, whereas facilitative determinants refer to specific individual resources and socio-demographic factors (education, income, age etc.) (Kleinhenz 1995; Knight and Marsh 2002) . Macro-level approaches, on the other hand, evaluate the determinants of total voting turnout rather than focusing on the individual (Franklin 2002; Norris 2002) . In this strand of research, cross-country variance is explained by cultural, economic, and -most importantly -politico-institutional settings (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crepaz 1990; Franklin 2002; Freitag 1996 Freitag , 2005 Norris 2004; Wernli 1998) . While micro-level research neglects the contextual framework within which individual actions take place, macro-level approaches face the risk of ecological fallacies. Against this background, we argue that non-voting has to be explained by both individual and contextual characteristics. Moreover, the environmental context also functions in an interactive manner, influencing the strength of the effect of individual characteristics on participation.
By combining individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation and modelling them simultaneously with multilevel analysis, we contribute to the overcoming of the "midlife crisis" facing electoral studies (Curtice 2002: 6) . We see multilevel analysis as a possibility to overcome the micro-macro dualism widely discussed in social sciences. With multilevel analyses, the determinants of individual behaviour can be analysed in a much more appropriate manner than with simple micro-analyses or macro-analyses (Hank 2003) .
For the first time, data on the 2003 Swiss elections allows the influence of the cantonal contexts on individual participation to be tested. We can therefore go further than the very rare existing studies on electoral participation in Switzerland, which are conducted either on the aggregate (Freitag 2005; Wernli 1998 Wernli , 2001 or the individual level (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998; Bühlmann et al. 2003) .
This contribution is divided into four sections. Before we turn to a short description of our method and our results we discuss the existing theoretical and empirical contributions to our investigation (next section). Our last section offers conclusions and outlines for future research.
Individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation: the theoretical background
We argue that the cantonal differences in the individual's propensity to vote can be explained by at least two conditions: First, we suggest that the cantons' different characteristics constitute different stimuli for voting propensity. Different starting positions in the vote race, different institutional settings, cultural backgrounds, socio-demographic constellations, and economic situations can be seen as different factors which influence an individual's propensity to participate in the federal elections.
Second, we assume an interaction between individual resources and contextual stimuli: we investigate the question of how different contextual frames influence the strength of the impact of individual resources on individual participation behaviour (cross-level interactions).
To test these suggestions, we need to analyse individual and contextual determinants of individual participation behaviour simultaneously. We initially analyse the individual-level determinants explaining individual voting propensity.
Individual resources as a condition for voting propensity
Most of the contributions analysing electoral participation have found the same couple of determinants to be important for an individual's decision to participate. The most important individual characteristics, attitudes, and dispositions can be embraced in five bundles of resources (Bühlmann 2006; Knight and Marsh 2002;  for an overview on the schools and approaches in participation research see Bühlmann et al. 2003) .
• Since Lazarsfeld et al. (1949) , socio-economic status (SES) has played a prominent role in explaining both the decision to vote and participation behaviour. Normally, socio-economic status consists of the individual's educational level, income, and her occupational status. In theory, a high SES leads to a higher propensity to participate in elections, because individuals with high education levels and/or with a high income have more disposable time and a greater capacity to understand political debates (Kleinhenz 1995) . This leads not only to greater political interest, but also to a greater probability of participation. Furthermore, wealthy individuals have an interest in contributing to the stability of the political system by participating in it (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
• Political skills are seen as the most important resource of participation (Bühlmann 2006) : individuals with a lot of political interest (Campbell et al. 1976; Lazarsfeld et al. 1949 ) and internal efficacy (Campbell et al. 1976 ) make wider use of all the different possibilities of influencing politics -including electoral participation -than uninterested individuals or persons who do not think they have the ability to participate in politics.
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• Political attitudes play a crucial role in the decision to vote. Since Campbell et al. (1976) , party ties have been considered long-term factors which stabilise electoral choices. However, party ties are also important for participation (Dalton et al. 1984) . People with only weak, or no party identification at all, show a lower propensity to participate in elections (Pattie and Johnston 1998 ). An important and widely discussed (especially in German political science (Feist 1992)) 3 factor is the attitude that voting is a civic duty. If participation in elections is seen as the fulfilment of one's duty as a citizen, the propensity to vote increases.
• At the beginning of survey research, social integration was still regarded as a prerequisite of political participation (Campbell et al. 1976; Key 1952; Verba and Nie 1972) . We can distinguish between three different developments: (1) socio-political integration, i.e. membership in vested interests such as parties and/or unions. This goes hand in hand with a specific political socialisation and a higher probability of contact with political peers. Both lead to a greater propensity to participate (Verba et al. 1978) . (2) The second development begins with the assumption that politically relevant affiliations to specific classes are disappearing. Therefore, integration in social 'everyday networks' also becomes politically relevant (Peterson 1990) . Individuals without any social contact, whether in primary groups (spouse, family) or in secondary groups (friends, neighbours) are not integrated and no longer take part in social and political life (Kleinhenz 1995) . The individual's mobility also plays an important role within this discussion: persons who have lived in the same place for a long time are more socially integrated and display more attachment and commitment. Relocation goes hand in hand with the loss of integration in neighbourhood networks. What follows is a decline of the propensity to participate (Glaeser et al. 2000) . (3) The two developments mentioned show a high proximity to social capital research, where social integration is an important core concept. In a Tocquevillian perspective, organisations are seen as 'schools' where members learn the rules of democratic behaviour (Paxton 2002) . From this perspective, integration into formal and informal organisations not only helps to train communication and cooperation skills, but also causes members to develop more trust in individuals on the one hand, and more support for the political system on the other hand. Trust, at least political trust, is considered a prerequisite of participation.
• The last bundle of resources concerns the individual's evaluation of the political system. Easton (1965) considers elections an important source of legitimisation. The political system and its representatives obtain the citizens' support only if the latter are satisfied by the output of the system (decisions and policies). Considering this, the declining turnout could be interpreted as an increasing loss of of the political system's legitimacy (Schwartz 1973) . According to Westle (1990) we can distinguish between short-term (e.g. trust in parliament) and long-term support factors (e.g. satisfaction with the political system). Individual support is an essential, but not sufficient condition of participation: at least some individuals who are satisfied with the functioning of politics do not participate, precisely because things are going well.
In short, we assume the probability of individual electoral participation to be higher the more a person is in possession of the above resources. We furthermore suggest that the differences in cantonal turnout can be explained by different effects of these resources on individual participation in the different cantons.
In addition, we control for age, sex, and confession. With regard to lifecycle effects, it is assumed that younger individuals are more likely to abstain from voting (Kleinhenz 1995) . Gender differences, in turn, are seen as both consequences of generation effects and of structural differences (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998). Lastly, in the Swiss case, confession is an important determinant of electoral participation (Wernli 2001) .
Contextual background as a condition for the propensity to vote
Various approaches can be found in internationally comparative participation research which seek to explain the differing participation levels in democratic parliamentary elections. Clearly, three research directions -the politicoinstitutional perspective, the politico-cultural approach, and the theory of socioeconomic resources -dominate the debate, while in research so far, institutional influencing variables have proven particularly operative and significant (Franklin 2004; Jackman and Miller 1995; Lijphart 1997: 7; Norris 2004) . In this section, we sum up the essential theoretical standpoints of these research perspectives. 
Politico-institutional perspective
In existing comparative electoral participation research, the most attention by far is paid to politico-institutional determinants (Lijphart 1997: 7) . Following the tradition of neo-institutionalism, this approach conceives of institutions as 'rules of the game' which facilitate certain action alternatives while preventing others. In other words: institutions, in this view, function equally as formalised rules and as social norms which facilitate, limit, or stimulate individual attitudes and actions (Immergut 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 43) . Macro-quantitative research generally distinguishes between politico-institutional conditions in the broader sense and factors concerning electoral law and administration (Norris 2004: 153) . While characteristics of the electoral, party, and government system belong to the former set of conditions, primarily organisational stipulations such as the existence of compulsory voting belong to the second category. Advocates of this institutional research perspective generally look for incentives or possible institutionalised barriers which coincide with participation in an election (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman and Miller 1995: 469; Norris 2004) .
Pursuant to the Swiss constitution (Article 149.2), the electoral system is the same in all cantons, i.e. proportional representation (PR) is used throughout all of the cantons. However, the number of available seats varies greatly from canton to canton and corresponds to the size of the population: while in the largest canton, Zurich, 34 seats are allocated, the candidates in the six smallest cantons compete for only one seat. In practice, this situation comes close to a majority vote. Relevant research identifies the type of electoral system as the first relevant variable towards an explanation of differences in electoral participation levels (Siaroff and Merer 2002) . Majority electoral systems are seen as barriers to high electoral participation, since (it is argued) elections are not controversial in safe constituencies or strongholds, and supporters of the previously defeated party or small parties stay away from the election because they consider their vote to be ineffective (Ladner and Milner 1999) . Additionally, previously defeated parties reduce their mobilisation efforts. In contrast, turnout should be higher under proportional systems, since voters will not feel that their vote is wasted, more parties are likely to run, and parties will have an incentive to campaign everywhere (Siaroff and Merer 2002: 920) . In Switzerland, single-seated cantons resemble majority systems. Again, in cantons with proportional systems the number of parties increases with the number of available seats (Wernli 2001) . Against this background we hypothesise that an increasing number of seats leads to a higher propensity to vote.
Party system. In their search for the driving forces behind participation rates, researchers frequently refer to the competitive situation within the party system (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 249; Wernli 1998) . This approach assumes that whilst elections with pre-determined outcomes bring about a degree of apathy and ignorance amongst voters, a strongly competitive inter-party situation at the outset has a stimulating effect.
5 At the same time, the weight of each individual vote is argued to increase with the supposed marginality of an electoral outcome. In other words: the more consequences an individual vote has for an electoral result, it is argued, the more likely citizens are to go to the ballot (Freitag 2005) . Furthermore, the number of parties is assumed to have an effect on electoral participation. The more fragmented a party system, the more multi-faceted the party-ideological spectrum becomes, and thus the more possibilities the voter has to find candidates in which he sees his interests represented and realised (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 248) . Thus, a large party diversity is said to boost willingness to participate in political elections. Finally, a high level of electoral participation should be traceable to a polarised party system, since opposite party camps are adept at keeping their respective clientele particularly close (Crepaz 1990; Norris 2004: 167) .
Institutions. Two competing assessments can be formulated regarding the influence of direct democracy on participation at parliamentary elections. The first conjecture assumes that a culture of active referendum democracy stimulates citizens' political interest (Hajnal and Lewis 2003) . Wernli (1998) , for instance, comparing 10 Swiss cantons concludes, that electoral participation is higher in the cantons where a more intensive form of direct democracy is practised The opposite to this hypothesis is the assumption of a negative relationship between direct democracy and electoral democracy. At least two reasons speak for this claim: first, sundry popular initiatives and referenda restrict the competencies of government, parliament, and parties. The voter recognises that she is in a position to decide authoritatively on important issues, independently and without recourse to members of parliament. Thus, from this perspective, political questions are decided on primarily in referenda and not at (less relevant) elections (Bühlmann et al. 2003; Linder 1999: 315) . Second, where there are several pillars of political co-determination, it is conceivable that a certain fatigue could arise regarding elections and referenda, mainly at the expense of less significant ballots (Jackman and Miller 1995: 483) and above all in cantons where the use of direct democracy instruments is high. Furthermore, cantons with a well-developed communal autonomy could be expected to ascribe little importance to national authorities, since the latters' limited powers of action and decision mean that elections to national parliament are considered largely irrelevant.
Electoral law and administration. Among the factors concerning electoral law and administration, compulsory voting is particularly significant in the explanation of electoral participation (Lijphart 1997) . On the international level, Italy and the Netherlands pursued this arrangement until 1993 and 1970 respectively. Today, compulsory voting continues to exist, for instance, in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Greece, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Turkey, and Cyprus. Among the Swiss cantons, compulsory voting exists only in the canton of Schaffhausen. Here, as in Australia or Belgium, citizens can be driven to vote by the threat of retrospective penalties.
6 While regular participation in the democratic process leads to the acquirement of a certain political competence and to the development of an active citizen's political interest (Pateman 1970; Wernli 1998) , compulsory voting leads us to expect a higher rate of participation at ballots (Franklin 2004 ).
Socio-political and politico-cultural determinants
Exponents of the politico-cultural and socio-integrative perspective emphasise that the willingness to participate in elections is not so much a result of institutional incentives and stimulants, as, primarily, an acquired habit (Norris 2004: 154) . Accordingly, other investigations attribute an influence on the level of electoral participation to socio-political and politico-cultural factors (Crepaz 1990; Gray and Caul 2000; Siaroff and Merer 2002) .
Socio-political integration characteristics. At least since Tocqueville's (1994) analyses, social science has been dealing with the significance of clubs and organisations for the social and political integration of individualistic societies. This perspective's fundamental ideas can be traced back to the politico-cultural research of the 1960s, when voluntary organisations are considered to be "the most important foundations" of stable democracies, and were thought to secure the latter's continued existence (Almond and Verba 1965: 220ff.) . Here, organisations act not only as mediums of political socialisation, but also as "schools for democracy", since they enable the "membership role" to be combined with the "role of citizen" in social practice. We expect cantons with a high density of membership, particularly in trade unions and parties, but also in other formal associations, to display a higher level of participation. A high cantonal degree of involvement in this respect is regarded as an environment which fosters civic behaviour, including the willingness to support the political system through electoral participation.
Politico-cultural characteristics. In the Swiss context, Catholicism is traditionally considered a significant, historically established politico-cultural driving force behind electoral participation. According to Wernli (1998: 96ff.) , there is a particularly strong bond in the Swiss cantons between the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Catholics. This historically entrenched relationship dates back to the defeat of the Catholic coalition at the end of the Sonderbundkrieg (short Swiss civil war, 1847). In the aftermath of this war, the Catholic population grew to perceive itself as a minority subordinated to worldly and modernising forces, and withdrew into a kind of isolated society in the strongholds of the Catholic cantons (Linder 1999: 37; Geser 2004) . In these cantons, federal order guaranteed the continuation of Catholic morals and customs. It is thought that in cantons with a Catholic majority, elections are perceived of as regular challenges to the bastion of Catholicism and essential Christian religious values. This perception, together with the clientelistic entanglements between party and ideology, is suggested to act as a mobilising force on electoral participation. In view of the shall be obliged to pay three Swiss francs." According to information given by the Schaffhausen State Chancellery, this sum is collected by the respective citizen's municipality.
enduring confessional-political culture in Switzerland (cf. Geser 2004), these connections ought also to affect more recent developments and to render political Catholicism a propulsive force on political participation.
At least two reasons oblige us to take not only the confessional, but also the language, cleavage into consideration. First, we can distinguish between the cantons by their type of democratic system. In existing research, the nonGerman cantons have typically been seen as representative systems, while the German speaking cantons pass as more direct-democratic systems (Kriesi 1998; Wernli 2001) : not only are cantonal constitutions in the Latin areas more oriented towards representative democracy, with fewer opportunities of direct legislation (Ladner 1991) , but the direct democratic instruments also are used more seldom than in the German speaking cantons (Linder 1999) . Second, the non-German cantons have minority status at the national level. We therefore suggest that individuals living in these cantons concentrate more on cantonal than federal politics, and thus tend to exercise their national voting rights less intensively. The first point of view leads us to expect that a higher degree of importance will be attached to elections, and that there will thus be a higher electoral turnout in Latin cantons. The second point, however, leads to contrary assumptions.
Socio-economic and socio-demographic determinants
Besides the approaches mentioned so far, extant comparative investigations refer to the effect of socio-economic and socio-demographic factors on participation rates at political elections. Thus, for instance, economic strength and population size are mentioned as particularly relevant influencing variables (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Norris 2004; Siaroff and Merer 2002: 917) .
Economic strength and modernity. Where existing research draws upon societies' cognitive and material resources to explain varying electoral participation rates, it refers primarily to differing levels of modernity and economic strength. A wellfunctioning economic system causes positive attitudes to develop towards the political system, strengthens political interest, and bestows the feeling that one's potential participation will be politically effective (Verba and Nie 1972: 125ff.) . Additionally, the higher a democracy's level of socio-economic development or degree of modernity, the higher will be the rate of electoral participation (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Siaroff and Merer 2002) . With a view to population size, researchers assume that less densely populated areas will display lower electoral participation, since a scattered population is more difficult to mobilise and relevant information is less accessible (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 242ff.) .
Contextual background as an influence on the impact of individual resources on the propensity to vote
In the section above we expected contextual factors to exert a direct influence on individual participation behaviour. However, in electoral studies, crosslevel interactions are of special interest: we assume that contextual factors affect individual participation not only in a direct, but also in an indirect manner, by influencing important individual resources. Norris (2004: 151 f.) , for example, highlights two main approaches in the search for an explanation of voter turnout: institutionalism and cultural modernisation theories. The first approach emphasises that institutions, the legal system, and electoral administrative procedures shape the costs and benefits of participation. The cultural theory approach stresses the affective aspect of participation. "The propensity to participate or abstain is a habit of the heart" (Norris 2004: 154) . This habit is seen as being acquired early in life and reinforced through experiences within a cultural context. Norris (2004: 176) concludes that "both these factors contribute toward understanding patterns of political participation." Freitag (2005: 686) , in his comparative research study on voter turnout in Swiss cantonal elections, draws a similar conclusion. According to his enquiry, two of the main factors explaining electoral participation in Switzerland are compulsory voting (on the institutional side) and Catholicism (on the cultural side) (see also Wernli 1998 Wernli , 2001 ). We therefore choose these two contextual characteristics to test the interactive effect of cantonal contextual factors on individual electoral participation behaviour. Wernli (1998 Wernli ( , 2001 ) highlights the differences between Catholic and nonCatholic cantons. He explains the higher turnout in Catholic cantons with stronger party ties to the dominant Catholic party (CVP) and a stronger sense of voting as a 'duty to defend the bastion of Catholicism'. In Catholic-dominated cantons, even individuals without strong political interest go to the polls. We can expect this sense of voting as a duty to exert an even stronger effect on Catholics living in Catholic cantons. We propose that Catholicism has three different crosslevel effects: (1) based on the idea of a diminishing marginal utility, we suggest that an augmented prevalence of the view that voting is a civic duty in nonCatholic cantons leads to more participation than in Catholic cantons, where this duty is more strongly internalised. (2) On the other hand, a large number of Catholics within a canton leads to a higher propensity to participate on the part of Catholics: the duty to defend the Catholic bastion is more internalised by Catholics. (3) A large number of Catholics in a canton should also affect the strength of the effect of a party tie. Closeness to a party is -as discussed above -an important factor fostering individual participation propensity. However, in Catholic-dominated regions, the inherent inclination to defend the bastion of Catholicism amplifies the effect of partisan ties. We therefore suggest a positive cross-level correlation effect between Catholicism and party ties.
Method
In the early days of scientific electoral research, contextual factors served as independent variables to explain aggregated turnout (Rice 1928; Siegfried 1949) . The development of survey-based empirical research since the 1930ies then led to a paradigm shift, resulting in a stronger focus on individual behaviour and its explanation. 8 However, "the traditional monolithic survey-based research project, designed to study voting behaviour at a particular election, is seen (...) to 8 Both methods have great disadvantages. With ecological analysis one cannot really explain individual behaviour (Lane and Ersson 1990) and always faces the danger of ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950 ; see also Stoker and Bowers 2002) . Moreover, the aggregating of individual values goes hand in hand with a great loss of information (Ditton 1998; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993) . But the survey-based method also has its pitfalls if one wants to analyse the influence of context. The treating of contextual variables as individuallevel data is known as the ''miraculous multiplication of the number of units" (Snjiders and Bosker 1999: 15) and leads to several problems such as the overestimation of standard errors (Goldstein 1987: 19; Hox and Kreft 1994: 285; Rasbash et al. 2002) , the correlation of the residuals, and the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of the data (Ditton 1998) . For a more detailed discussion see Bühlmann 2006; Goldstein 1987: 19; Jones 1997; Hox and Kreft 1994: 285; Rasbash et al. 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999; Stoker and Bowers 2002. be approaching the end of its useful life" (Franklin and Wlezien 2002: 169) . One possible way out of the "midlife crisis" facing electoral research (Curtice 2002: 6) is seen in the combination of both the macro-level and the micro-level (Bühlmann 2006) . 9 The simultaneous modelling of individual and contextual determinants to explain individual behaviour is possible with the multilevel analysis used in this contribution. By considering the multilevel structure of data not as a nuisance but as a substance (Jones 1997 ), multilevel models not only distinguish different variations at different levels, but make it possible to measure varying relationships between variables based on the difference of contexts (cross-levelinteractions).
The underlying principle of multilevel modelling is quite simple: intercepts of common linear ordinary least square (OLS)-regression analysis are allowed to vary.
(1) y ij = b 0j + b 1 X 1ij + e ij , where (2) b 0j = b 0 + m 0j (m 0j stands for the residuals at the context level).
Additionally, multilevel models allow the modelling of cross-level interaction, measuring the influence of contextual factors on the strength of connection between response and predictor variables (methodologically speaking the steepness of the slope).
Our dependent variables have a dichotomous form. 10 Therefore, we do not use OLS-regression for our estimation, but transform the dependent variable in a logit structure. Estimation and interpretation for logit multilevel analysis are similar to those used in conventional logit analysis (see for example Long 1997) .
We proceed -in accordance with our initial questions -in three steps: first, we test the explanatory strength of the individual resources, controlling for nonspecified contextual effects 11 : (3) logit(p ij ) = b 1 + b 2 X 2ij + ... + b n X nij + e ij + m 0j 9 Of course, the idea that context influences individual behaviour is not new at all. It has been crucial at least since the suicide analysis by Durkheim (1960 Durkheim ( [1897 ). However, corresponding quantitative analyses in political science in the past century lacked the methodological basis to properly analyse contextual effects.
10 Individual participation propensity is measured by the following question: ''In general, about half of all eligible voters go to the polls at national elections. What about you: did you take part in the national elections on October 19 th or not?" The measurement of all independent variables can be found in the appendix.
11 The respondents were asked in which canton they are entitled to vote. The number of individuals per canton does not fall below the methodologically required number of 25 level-1-subjects per, at least, 25 level-2-objects (Jones 1997 ).
The participation probability of an individual i within a municipality j (p ij ) is explained by an overall participation mean (b 1 ), individual characteristics (X, their estimates b respectively), individual variation (e ij with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within-context variance of s 2 ), and contextual variation (m 0j with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between-context variance of s u 2 ). Second, we specify the contextual level with contextual factors (W, their estimates a respectively).
(4) logit(p ij ) = b 1 + b 2 X 2ij + ... + b n X nij + a 1 W 1j + ... + a n W nj + e ij + m 0j
Finally, we estimate the cross-level interaction with the selected individual (k) and contextual variables (k) (W kj X kij , their estimates g respectively). Note that in those cases we model a varying effect of the individual variable X k on participation (denoted by the j of the estimate).
(5) logit(p ij ) = b 1 + b 2 X 2ij + ... + b kj X kij + ... + b n X nij + a 1 W 1j + ... + a n W nj + g 1 W kj X kij + m 1j X kij +e ij + m 0j
We forgo a deeper discussion on the method and refer to the relevant literature on multilevel analysis in general (Goldstein 1987; Jones 1997; Snijders and Bosker 1999) and on multilevel analysis with logit structures (Goldstein 1991; Guo and Zhao 2000) .
Results
Table 1 summarises two of our three steps. The results of our contextual analyses can be seen in columns 3 to 8 (model 2 to model 7). The individual analysis is summarised in column 2 (model 1): as expected, political skills are of great importance for individual participation. Individuals with a high level of political interest and individuals who evaluate themselves as being able to influence the political system have a much higher propensity to go to the polls than persons not interested in politics and persons without a sense of efficacy. However, and somewhat surprisingly, after the discussion in the framework of the 'Normalisierungsthese', the strongest influence on the probability of individual participation in elections is exerted by the sense of the 'duty to vote'. The probability that an individual will go to the polls is higher (ceteris paribus) in cases where the individual fully agrees with the statement that participating in elections is a civic duty than in cases where she does not agree with this statement. Party ties also exert an enhancing effect on the individual's propensity to participate.
The effects of the variables labelled as 'social capital' terms do not evenly foster individuals' participation: while the somewhat weak factors 'trust' and 'involvement' show no effect, the more sturdy 'political membership', 'residential stability', the fact of not living alone (labelled as 'civil status'), and -most importantly -the 'frequency of discussions on politics', exert a boosting effect on the individual's propensity to vote. Finally, the variables measuring trust and satisfaction with the political system and its representatives also show explanatory strength for the individual's decision to go to the polls. Three further aspects are worth noting: first, if we take a look at the predisposition variables, we can observe that the probability to vote accumulates with increasing age. Neither sex nor confession meet the 99%-significance criterion. Second, the SES measures, once controlled for all the other variables, no longer explain differences in individual participation. Neither a high level of education nor a high income seem to be a prerequisite of participation at the 2003 Swiss national elections. Third, the significant contextual level variance in model 1 reveals the appropriateness of the multilevel approach for analysing the electoral participation in Swiss national elections.
To avoid the methodological problems involved in testing the contextual effects on individual participation -above all the problems of multicollinearity 12 -we build several models with our variables measuring the different theoretical influences, step by step, on the basis of model 2. 13 In the model with all electoral and party system variables (model 2), only 'party competition' meets the significance criterion: the greater the gap between the percentages of votes attained by the two strongest parties in a canton, the lower is the individual's propensity to vote. The number of seats, number of parties, and polarisation do not explain the variance of individual participation between the cantons. Compulsory voting fosters individuals' participation, while measures installed by the government system (the offer and use of direct democracy and the degree of decentralisation) show no influence (model 3). As on the individual level, partisanship is also important at the cantonal level. A high density of partisanship seems to contribute to a higher degree of politicisation in society, fostering an individual's propensity to vote (model 4). However, the partisanship density no longer shows any explanatory strength in the final model (model 7).
Taking a look at the politico-cultural characteristics (model 5), we can see the fostering effect of Catholicism also observed by Wernli (1998 Wernli ( , 2001 : the larger the number of Catholics in a canton, the greater the probability that an individual living in this canton will go to the polls. Taking a look at the individual level, where we saw that Catholics apparently have a lower propensity to vote than non-Catholics (significant at the 95% level only), the result is surprising. Model 7 
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Contextual Level
RANDOM EFFECTS
Individual level variance 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
MODEL PROPERTIES
Number of cases (cantons) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) Note: * = significant at least on the 99% level (individual level parameters) and on the 90% level respectively (contextual level parameters). All variables rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value for the variable. For an operationalisation of all variables, see appendix. All models estimated using the "second order penalised quasi-likelihood" method and RIGLS (see Goldstein and Rasbash 1996) . All calculations weighted with combined individual weight (weight for cantonal. sampling x weight for individual participation / non-participation).
We will discuss this result later. Finally, none of the socio-economic and sociodemographic determinants in model 6 exert an effect on an individual's propensity to vote. In the final model, model 7, we put the four cantonal characteristics together. While partisanship density loses its explanatory strength, competition, compulsory voting, and Catholicism can clearly be seen as boosters of individuals' propensity to go to the polls: an individual A with the same individual resources as individual B, but living in the canton with the highest party competition, is more likely to vote. Living in the canton Schaffhausen increases the participation probability 15 and an individual living in the canton with the highest number of Catholics (canton Uri) is more likely to go to the polls than an individual living in the canton with the lowest number of Catholics (canton Berne). 16 These three contextual variables are capable of explaining a large amount of variance in participation between the cantons (see the no more significant contextual-level variance).
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In order to test for cross-level interactions, we proceed in two steps. First, we test for the basic premise of cross-level interactions, i.e. that the individual resources under suspicion (interest, 'duty to vote', confession, and party ties) exert different effects on individual participation propensity in different cantons. We do this on the basis of model 7 (in table 1). 18 Second, and again on the basis of model 7, we investigate the different cross-level effects.
The tests of the basic premise are positive: the effect of individual political interest, of the 'duty to vote', of confession, and of party ties varies significantly (at least at the 95% level) between the cantons (see models 8 -11 in table 2). This means that an increase of these four individual resources in fact leads, in all cantons, to a higher individual propensity to participate. However, the strength of these effects varies widely from canton to canton: the slope variance of all four variables is significant at the 95% level. That means that an increase of political interest, of the 'duty to vote', of confession, and of party ties leads to a higher individual propensity to vote in some cantons than in other cantons. Additionally, political interest, the 'duty to vote', and party ties show a significant negative covariance: in cantons where the mean individual propensity to participate is high (methodologically speaking, where the intercept takes a high value), an increase of political interest, of the notion that participation is a civic duty, and of the strength of an individual's party tie, lead to a greater probability of participation, but to a lesser degree than in cantons where the mean individual propensity to vote is lower ( figure 1) . Figure 1 shows that the variation between the cantons grows, the more the individuals are interested in politics and the more they approach the vote as a duty. That means that the contextual characteristics exert a greater influence on these individuals.
We are now interested in whether these variances in the effects are due to the suggested cantonal properties. Can the differences of the strength of interest, the 'duty to vote', confession, and party ties be at least partly explained by compulsory voting and cantonal confessional dominance?
As models 12 and 13 in table 2 show, the question has to be answered in the negative 19 , with one exception: a high number of Catholics exerts a negative influence on the effect of party ties on individual participation. Individuals with party ties are normally more likely to participate than individuals without a certain closeness to a party. However, for individuals living in cantons with a high number of Catholics, this effect is much weaker than for individuals living in cantons where Protestantism is the dominant confession. In some cantons the effect of party ties on the estimated individual propensity to vote is even negative (see diagram 3 in figure 1 ). These are precisely those cantons with the highest proportions of Catholics (Jura, Valais).
Two ad-hoc interpretations of these findings are possible: first, one could assume that in homogeneous Catholic cantons, the CVP is clearly the strongest party and other parties do not have a chance of winning. This would mean that individuals with ties to parties other than the CVP do not vote. Second, in the last ten years, the strength of the CVP even in the cantons with a very high number of Catholics has declined. Other parties have become more and more important. In this case, it could be assumed that individuals with strong ties to the CVP do not go to the polls because they are disappointed with their party. However, their integration in the Catholic milieu does not permit these individuals to vote for another party. The only solution in this case would be abstention. Simple cantonwise cross-tabulations seem rather to support the first assumption.
19 Some further tests, not presented here, with the dependent variables interest, 'duty to vote', and party ties show further notable results: first, all three variables vary not only between individuals but also between cantons. Second, compulsory voting does not explain the variance of interest between the cantons, and the number of Catholics does not significantly explain the uneven distribution of party ties and the 'duty to vote'. The assumption -widely accepted in Swiss political science research -that compulsory voting leads to more individual political interest, and that Catholicism fosters the 'duty to vote' and party ties, cannot be reproduced with our data and method. Of course, these assumptions would justify the trouble of further and more intensive investigation. 
MODEL PROPERTIES
Number of cases (cantons) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) 4631 (26) Note: * = significant at least on the 99% level (individual level parameters) and on the 90% level respectively (contextual level parameters). All variables rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value of the variable. For an operationalisation of all variables, see appendix. All models estimated using the "second order penalised quasi-likelihood" method and RIGLS (see Goldstein and Rasbash 1996) . All calculations weighted with combined individual weight (weight for cantonal sampling x weight for individual participation / non-participation). 
Conclusion
In this contribution, we have investigated the question of the differences in participation between the Swiss cantons at the Swiss federal elections in 2003.
To summarise our results, we can say that Swiss federal elections are in fact cantonal elections. The differences in individual propensity to vote are due, at least partly, not only to different distributions of important individual resources between the citizens, but also to differences between cantonal characteristics in respect to the cantonal party system and the degree of competition, the electoral administration, and politico-cultural characteristics. In short: married and older members of political parties with a high level of political interest and political efficacy, who agree with the statement that voting is a civic duty, who have strong party ties, a high degree of residential stability, frequent political discussions, trust in the national parliament, and who are satisfied with the political system, show the highest propensity to vote. However, two individuals with exactly these individual resources will differ in their propensity to vote if they live in different cantons. Citizens of cantons where party competition and the number of Catholics are high have a stronger starting position, so to speak, in terms of their propensity to vote than citizens living in cantons without competition and with low numbers of Catholics. Compulsory voting also fosters individual participation.
Additionally, we have shown that some individual resources have different effects on the individual propensity to vote in different cantons: political interest, the 'duty to vote', confession, and party ties vary in their effects on individual electoral participation. However, we cannot explain this variance by means of the expected cantonal characteristics. Compulsory voting and Catholicism seem not to be responsible for the varying effects of political interest, confession, and the 'duty to vote'. However, a high number of Catholics within a canton weakens the positive effect of party ties on individual participation. We assume that this effect is due to the specific party-system situation in Catholic cantons where the CVP dominates. Individuals with strong ties to the dominating party in the Catholic cantons (CVP) do show a high propensity to vote; however, individuals with party ties to other parties do not participate because the chance that their preferred party will win in Catholic cantons is low.
The findings reported in this paper clearly indicate that an individual's propensity to vote is influenced by both personal characteristics as well as cantonal attributes. In this respect, future research on individual electoral participation has to consider this fact not only in a theoretical but also in a methodological manner. The factor values are used as a scale.
Appendix: Operationalisation of the variables
They are rescaled from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
+ C
Political Attitudes
Voting as a civic duty
The more an individual agrees with the statement that voting is a civic duty, the higher is his/her propensity to vote. 
